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INTRODUCTION
Concern has mounted in recent decades about dark, publicly
unattributed money contributed to political campaigns by extremely wealthy
Americans, corporations, and unions. Frequently, dark money is lawfully
transferred to candidates for office without public attribution of any source,
through nonprofit conduits.1 A body of literature addresses the wisdom of
allowing nonprofits to facilitate dark money contributions, and there are
good reasons to be concerned.2 “In general, elected officials are warranted in
1
See Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections &
How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 384–
85 (2013) (explaining that dark money refers to when the sources of funds used to make election spending
expenditures are not disclosed to the public).
2
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO
STOP IT 252–59 (2012) (discussing transparency in campaign contributions); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 281–82 (2010) (proposing an increase in disclosure
of information about substantial contributors); Michael R. Siebecker, Political Insider Trading,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2717, 2725 (2017) (“[T]o the extent corporations remain free to skulk about the
political arena injecting dark money into campaigns under a cloak of anonymity, the electorate cannot
effectively assess whether politicians remain in the pocket of corporate interests and shareholders cannot
determine whether corporate managers use the corporate treasury to advance personal political
interests.”); Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations,
91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895, 897 (2016) (“Dark money may be solely an election law problem . . . .
However, if there are concerns about nonprofit organizations in politics that implicate the policies relating
to nonprofits, there might be something beyond election law at issue that state nonprofit law might
address.”); New York Times Editorial Board, Editorial, The I.R.S. Gives Up on ‘Dark Money’, N.Y. TIMES
(July 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/opinion/sunday/the-irs-gives-up-on-darkmoney.html [https://perma.cc/737Z-WYEC]. See generally JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 247–53 (2016) (explaining the
role of dark money in the 2010 U.S. midterm elections); Ellen P. Aprill, The Section 527 Obstacle to
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raising and spending as much money as possible,” because the “shorthand
for political success—more money, more votes” has been generally
validated,3 as has the supposition that large campaign donors often get
preferential treatment from the elected officials they support.4
The discussion which follows is a part of the dark money discussion,
but it is not about eliminating legal dark donations to nonprofit conduits. It
is about nonprofits that may handle illegal dark donations made principally
by sending unlawful foreign contributions to favored candidates through
501(c)(4) nonprofits. While it is true that dark money given by U.S. citizens
can unduly affect the outcome of political campaigns, the perils intrinsic to
allowing foreign countries, foreign nationals, and foreign corporations to
influence the U.S. electoral process are different and greater than the dangers
posed by such legal dark money.5
This Essay addresses how to hold nonprofits and culpable officers,
directors, and staff accountable for contributing dark money under federal
and state law, and discusses the shortcomings with current approaches. Part
I examines the incidence of unlawful foreign interference in political
elections through the use of nonprofit conduits. Part II considers the
implications of a federal law violation under Federal Election Law, criminal
statutes, and the IRS. Part III addresses state law violations, along with the
power of the state attorney general. Part IV addresses the overlay between
state and federal authority. Finally, this Essay concludes that federal tax and
Meaningful Section 501(c)(4) Regulation, 13 PITT. TAX REV. 43, 47 (2015) (highlighting intrinsic
difficulties of regulating dark money through the Internal Revenue Code).
3
Philip Bump, Does More Campaign Money Actually Buy More Votes: An Investigation, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/11/does-more-campaign-moneyactually-buy-more-votes-investigation/355154/ [https://perma.cc/CRV7-VB3U].
4
See Tara Siegel Bernard, A Citizen’s Guide to Buying Political Access, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/your-money/a-citizens-guide-to-buying-political-access-.html
[https://perma.cc/NG7Q-Z262]. The article reports on a study that discovered a positive correlation
between campaign donations and access to politicians. See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman,
Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment,
60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 545 (2016).
5
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352 (2009) (explaining
that the Framers were particularly concerned with foreign corruption); Matt A. Vega, The First
Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v.
FEC, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 951, 959 (2011) (justifying statutory prohibitions on foreign contributions
notwithstanding Citizens United v. FEC); Sean J. Wright, Reexamining Criminal Prosecutions Under the
Foreign Nationals Ban, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 563, 584–86 (2018) (arguing for an
urgent need to strengthen the ban on contributions from foreign nationals); Zachary J. Piaker, Note, Can
“Love” Be A Crime? The Scope of the Foreign National Spending Ban in Campaign Finance Law,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1857, 1857 (2018) (exploring whether intangibles, such as information about a
political opponent, fall within the ban); see also Anna Su, Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality
and the First Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2014) (excluding foreign campaign
contributions from argument for extending extraterritoriality).
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election laws are likely to be less effective than the power conferred on a
state attorney general to supervise nonprofits in the public interest.
I.

BACKGROUND

Beginning in 1966, foreign contributions to domestic political
campaigns were limited in order to protect national sovereignty and prevent
foreign intrusion in domestic elections.6 Since 1976, there has been an
outright prohibition on foreign contributions to political campaigns.7 In
2002, Congress strengthened these restrictions, and in 2012, the Supreme
Court affirmed a decision declining to extend the reasoning of Citizens
United8 to invalidate the prohibition on foreign corporate contributions on
First Amendment grounds.9 As then-Judge (now Justice) Kavanaugh wrote,
It is fundamental to the definition of our national political community that
foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may
be excluded from, activities of democratic self-government . . . . [T]he United
States has a compelling interest . . . in limiting the participation of foreign
citizens in activities of American democratic self-government, and in thereby
preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.10

Notwithstanding these legal prohibitions, foreign states, foreign
corporations, and foreign nationals have channeled funds in an intentionally
clandestine fashion through nonprofit political organizations, and other types
of nonprofits, into the hands of political candidates running for office in the
United States.11 In 1996, for example, the Justice Department investigated
6
Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance
System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 508–10 (1997); 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012); see also Foreign
Nationals, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, (June 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/foreign-nationals
[https://perma.cc/7TSU-XVV7].
7
Brown, supra note 6, at 511. The view that a blanket ban on foreign contributions is unwise and
unenforceable is offered by Jeffrey K. Powell, Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from Foreign
Sources: Questioning Their Justification in a Global Interdependent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 957, 959 (1996). Internationally, Powell reported, most democratically governed nations have blanket
prohibitions against foreign contributions to elections, including Japan, India, Spain, Mexico, and
Canada, although Great Britain does not explicitly prohibit foreign contributions. Id. at 972–73.
8
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9
Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012) (affirming 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011)). In 2002,
U.S. law also prohibited foreign nationals from involvement in the management of a political committee,
including any separate segregated fund-nonconnected committee, or the nonfederal accounts of any of
these committees. 11 C.F.R § 110.20 (2005).
10
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 at 288.
11
See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Democrats Are Fined $243,000 for Fund-Raising Violations, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/21/us/democrats-are-fined-243000-for-fundraising-violations.html [https://perma.cc/6DPE-JCNL]; Bob Woodward & Brian Duffy, Chinese
Embassy
Role
in
Contributions
Probed,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
13,
1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/02/13/chinese-embassy-role-in-contributions-
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whether the Chinese military schemed to transfer money to the nonprofit
Democratic National Campaign Committee (DNCC), and from there to
President Bill Clinton’s reelection campaign.12 The DNCC gave back $2.8
million it had received from individuals and for-profit entities,13 and a
501(c)(3) religious organization, the International Buddhist Progress
Society, also agreed to pay a civil penalty related to allegations of corporate
facilitation of illegal contributions.14 More recently, a Mexican businessman
was convicted of violating federal election laws for improperly using funds
to influence the 2012 San Diego mayoral election,15 and a U.S. citizen
pleaded guilty to facilitating illegal donations to an Obama campaign
committee.16

probed/62d55b8d-490f-49b2-9243-91f35ee4076b/?utm_term=.100d91cc886d [https://perma.cc/7EFHZJLC]; John Fund, Not All Foreign-Influence Scandals Are Created Equal, NAT’L REV. (July 16, 2017,
10:35 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/07/chinese-illegally-donated-bill-clinton-reelectioncampaign-media-downplayed [https://perma.cc/5R4V-RG5M].
12
James Bennet, Clinton Says Chinese Money Did Not Influence U.S. Policy, N.Y. Times (May 18,
1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/18/us/clinton-says-chinese-money-did-not-influence-uspolicy.html [https://perma.cc/Z6VC-K3KF]; see also Woodward & Duffy, supra note 11.
13
Dan Balz, Democrats Return $1.4 Million in Questionable Donations, WASH. POST (June 28,
1997), 1997 WLNR 7203134 (Westlaw) (detailing total amount returned as $2.8 million, including some
amounts where the DNC lacked sufficient information about donors).
14
Conciliation Agreement at 1–2, 8, In re International Buddhist Progress Society, Inc., (Nov. 27,
2000), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/4530/00000306.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY42-B54A]; Robert
Lenhard, FEC Issues Zero Tolerance Decision on Foreign National Contributions, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP: INSIDE POL. L. (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2014/11/21/fecissues-zero-tolerance-decision-on-foreign-national-contributions/ [https://perma.cc/8FBS-BZRH]; Al
Gore
and
the
Temple
of
Cash,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
22,
1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/22/opinion/al-gore-and-the-temple-ofcash.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=51B1F5DCF9A12C80B3C334DAA71EE91C&gwt=pay
[https://perma.cc/UEE5-DJRD] (describing Justice Department allegations of foreign gifts from
American Buddhist monks to Al Gore during the 1996 election).
15
Indictment (2nd Superseding), United States v. Matsura, No. 14CR0388-MMA (S.D. Cal. Mar.
4, 2016), 2016 WL 9080188; Greg Moran, Judge Sentences Azano to Three Years in Federal Prison, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sdme-azano-sentencing-20171027-story.html [https://perma.cc/3RRY-A3Q3]. According to the
Government’s case, Azano used individual “straw donors” to make donations for candidates on his behalf,
in addition to “in-kind” services to campaigns that were funded by foreign money. Indictment (2nd
Superseding), Matsura, 2016 WL 9080188; Indictment (Superseding) at 6–7, United States v. Matsura,
No. 14CR00388-MMA (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014), 2014 WL 10384719.
16
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fla. Man Pleads Guilty to Helping Disguise Foreign Contribution
During 2012 Presidential Election and Making False Declaration before Grand Jury (July 25, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-pleads-guilty-helping-disguise-foreign-contribution-during2012-presidential [https://perma.cc/L6YM-5XPU]; Nate Raymond, Florida Man Admits Helping Funnel
2012
Foreign
Political
Contribution,
REUTERS
(July
25,
2016,
2:53
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-florida-crime-election-idUSKCN10527V [https://perma.cc/FBE34BZZ]. The campaign committee cooperated with investigators and was not accused of wrongdoing.
Raymond, supra.
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The scope of the problem caused by a lack of public information about
dark money sources, and whether any of these sources could be foreign, is
demonstrated by recent speculation over campaign support from the National
Rifle Association (NRA) during the 2016 election cycle. The NRA operates
as a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization, which is chartered in New York.17
The NRA reported spending millions more during the 2016 campaign cycle
on political campaign intervention than it had spent in previous cycles.18
During this time, NRA officials and members also allegedly had contact with
Russian nationals. According to a Statement of Offense by the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia, senior staff and board members of a
“gun rights organization” communicated with Russians in the United States,
and also visited Russia.19 These allegations have led to speculation that
17
The National Rifle Association (NRA) consists of several affiliated entities, including the National
Rifle Association of America, a 501(c)(4) organization incorporated in New York; the NRA Foundation,
a 501(c)(3) organization incorporated in the District of Columbia; and the National Rifle Association of
America Political Victory Fund, a political action committee that engaged in the support of pro-gun
candidates during the 2016 election cycle. See National Rifle Association of America Political Victory
Fund:
Spending
2015–2016,
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00053553/?cycle=2016&tab=spending [https://perma.cc/CG2QSWKX].
18
Reports of NRA support during the 2016 election cycle vary. During the two-year period from
January 1, 2015 until December 31, 2016, the NRA Political Victory Fund reported $21,260,409.45 in
political contributions to the FEC. See National Rifle Association of America Political Victory Fund:
Financial
Summary
2015–2016,
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00053553/?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/747Y-6V2S]. This
amount is nearly a fifty percent increase over the 2011 to 2012 period. See National Rifle Association of
America Political Victory Fund: Financial Summary 2011–2012, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00053553/?cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/D295-3MPR]. A larger
amount was reported to the FEC by the NRA’s lobbying arm, the Institute for Legislative Action. See
National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action: Spending 2015–2016, supra note 17.
According to an analysis by the Center for Responsive Politics, “the PAC and nonprofit arms of the NRA
spent a combined $54.4 million in the 2016 elections . . . . $35.2 million, was channeled through the NRA
Institute for Legislative Action (NRA-ILA).” Robert Maguire, Audit Shows NRA Spending Surged $100
Million Amidst Pro-Trump Push in 2016, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/11/audit-shows-nra-spending-surged-100-million-amidst-protrump-push-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/ZLW6-N22H]; see also Peter Stone & Greg Gordon, Web of Elite
Russians Met with NRA Execs During 2016 Campaign, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (June 11, 2018, 5:00
AM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/latest-news/article212756749.html [https://perma.cc/7SYP-5RGQ]
(“The NRA, Trump’s biggest financial backer, spent more than $30 million to boost his upstart candidacy;
that’s more than double what it laid out for 2012 GOP nominee Mitt Romney, and the NRA money started
flowing much earlier in the cycle for Trump.”).
19
Mariia Butina, also known as Maria Butina, a Russian national living in the United States, pled
guilty to acting as a Russian agent and conspiring with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to involve
the NRA (“Gun Rights Organization”) in furthering a “back channel of communication” to the NRA and
the Republican Party (“Political Party 1”). Indictment, United States v. Butina, No. 18-cr-00218-TSC
(D.D.C. July 17, 2018), 2018 WL 3455963 [hereinafter Butina Indictment]; Plea Agreement, United
States v. Butina, No. 18-cr-00218-TSC (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2018), 2018 WL 6583981 [hereinafter Butina
Plea]; Statement of Offense, United States v. Butina, No. 18-cr-00218-TSC (D.D.C. May 1, 2019)
[hereinafter Butina Statement]. She cooperated with investigators and was sentenced to eighteen months
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foreign contributions might have been made from Russia or another country,
using the NRA, an affiliate, or some 501(c)(4) organization as a conduit,
during the period of the 2016 election campaign.20 The NRA has denied using
foreign funds for political activities,21 but reports indicate that federal
authorities have investigated whether the NRA used foreign donations to
support political campaigns.22 To date, all investigations have resulted in no

in prison. Sara Murray & David Shortell, Alleged Russian Agent Maria Butina Sentenced to 18 Months
in
Prison
on
Conspiracy
Charge,
CNN
(Apr.
27
2019,
6:59
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/26/politics/maria-butina-sentencing/index.html [https://perma.cc/98G3BBRT]. In pleading guilty, Butina admitted to working with a Republican operative and boyfriend, Paul
Erickson (identified in court papers as “U.S. Person 1”) at the behest of a Russian official in order “to
establish unofficial lines of communication with Americans having power and influence over U.S.
politics . . . . for the benefit of the Russian Federation . . . .” Butina Statement, supra, at 2; see Criminal
Complaint, United States v. Butina, No. 18-cr-00218-TSC (D.D.C. July 14, 2018), 2018 WL 3455966.
The indictment of Butina does not allege that Butina sought to or did funnel funds from Russia to the
NRA. Butina Indictment, supra.
20
See, e.g., Chris Smith, “Coincidence Number 395”: The N.R.A. Spent $30 Million to Elect Trump.
Was It Russian Money?, VANITY FAIR (June 21, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/06/thenra-spent-dollar30-million-to-elect-trump-was-it-russian-money [https://perma.cc/S9GM-A3YV].
21
Tim Mak, NRA Says It Receives Foreign Funds, But None Goes to Election Work, NPR (Mar. 27,
2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597279176/nra-says-it-receives-foreign-funds-butnone-goes-to-election-work [https://perma.cc/2N4U-DMS9]. However, the NRA has acknowledged
receiving small donations from foreign sources. Id.; Trish Turner & Matthew Mosk, NRA Says It Received
One Contribution of Less Than $1000 from a Russian, ABC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:19 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/amp/Politics/nra-received-contribution-1000russian/story?id=54080082&__twitter_impression=true [https://perma.cc/CV8N-LG25]. The NRA
acknowledged a small donation representing life membership dues from Alexander Torshin, the Russian
official understood to be referenced to in the Maria Butina case, but “NRA General Counsel John C.
Frazer, in a letter to Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon . . . said the gun-rights group accepted foreign donations,
though not for electioneering purposes.” Turner & Mosk, supra.
22
Peter Stone & Greg Gordon, FBI Investigating Whether Russian Money Went to NRA to Help
Trump, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Jan. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://amp.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article195231139.html
[https://perma.cc/WUM5-HVG5]. But see Mark Follman, The NRA Has Deep Ties to Accused Russian
Spy Maria Butina, MOTHER JONES (July 19, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/07/nramaria-butina-spying-charges-trump-campaign [https://perma.cc/2AME-KM5X] (stating FBI would
“neither confirm nor deny” the existence of an investigation). The Attorney General of New York
opened an investigation of the tax-exempt status of the NRA and its affiliated entities in April 2019,
without specifying its particular concerns. See Danny Hakim, N.R.A. President to Step Down as New
York Attorney General Investigates, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/us/oliver-north-nra.html [https://perma.cc/9TGN-3E9U]; see also
Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., AG James Stops NRA from Attending Interviews of Witnesses
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-james-stops-nra-attending-interviews-witnesses
[https://perma.cc/F4HV-VK9Z]. Investigations into the NRA and its charitable foundation also arose in
the District of Columbia. See Katie Zezima, Carol D. Leonnig & Keith L. Alexander, D.C. Attorney
General Issues Subpoenas to NRA, Its Charitable Foundation, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/dc-attorney-general-issues-subpoenas-to-nra-its-charitablefoundation/2019/07/12/835bb30e-a4bb-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html [https://perma.cc/P2G2LFTR] (reporting that the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia issued subpoenas
to the NRA and the NRA Foundation as part of an investigation into a possible violation of the
District’s Nonprofit Act, and noting that “[t]wo Democratic House members have written to NRA
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charges or official accusations that the NRA used foreign funds to support
domestic political campaigns.23 However, because nonprofits are not
required to disclose their donors’ identities,24 observers (including media and
members of Congress) have continued to ask questions about the increase in
NRA campaign support for U.S. elections.25
The use of 501(c)(4) organizations to engage in political activity and
fund political campaigns has expanded significantly over the past decade.26
Nonetheless, public records do not reveal that either the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have imposed a

Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre, stating they were concerned about a ‘complex web of
relationships’ between the organization and Russia.”).
23
See James Bamford, The Spy Who Wasn’t, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/153036/maria-butina-profile-wasnt-russian-spy [https://perma.cc/98ZCYQHJ] (stating the FBI investigation “produced no evidence of illicit cash transfers” and arguing that
Butina was a scapegoat for the 2016 election); see also Butina Plea, supra note 19; Butina Statement,
supra note 19; Butina Indictment, supra note 19 (including no admissions in Butina’s plea agreement or
statement of offense that she sought to or did transfer or assist in the transfer of Russian funds to the NRA
to support U.S. political campaigns).
24
Sugin, supra note 2, at 899–900 (“[T]he identity of donors to (c)(4) organizations remains
secret . . . .”); see Rev. Proc. 2018-38, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280 (“These [Section 501(c)(3)] organizations are
no longer required to report the names and addresses of their contributors on the Schedule B of their
Forms 990 or 990–EZ.”); see also Cory G. Kalanick, Note, Blowing Up the Pipes: The Use of (c)(4) to
Dismantle Campaign Finance Reform, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2254, 2258 (2011).
25
See, e.g., Igor Derysh, Maria Butina’s Boyfriend Claimed He Set Up Trump-Russia NRA
“Conduit” as Campaign Funds Flowed, SALON (Dec. 12, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2018/12/12/maria-butinas-boyfriend-claimed-he-set-up-trump-russia-nraconduit-as-campaign-funds-flowed [https://perma.cc/A4QJ-UEQB]; Danny Hakim, N.R.A. Seeks
Distance From Russia as Investigations Heat Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/us/nra-russia-maria-butina-investigations.html
[https://perma.cc/KT62-D2TZ]; Pete Madden & Matthew Mosk, Lawmakers Launch New Probe into
‘Complex Web’ of Alleged Ties Between NRA, Russians, ABC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2019, 9:02 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lawmakers-launch-probe-complex-web-alleged-tiesnra/story?id=61137356 [https://perma.cc/9ZQX-X7J6] (reporting inquiry by Reps. Kathleen Rice and
Ted Lieu into Moscow trip by NRA members). There is no readily available information on the NRA
website pertaining to foreign donors. NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org [https://perma.cc/B3N58UNF].
26
Michael Beckel, Nonprofits Outspent Super PACs in 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 18, 2012),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/06/nonprofits-outspent-super-pacs-in-2
[https://perma.cc/QKN7-ZPY3] (“While super PACs were cast as the big, bad wolves during the last
election, the groups were outspent by “social welfare” organizations by a 3-2 margin, a trend that may
continue amid reports that major donors are giving tens of millions of dollars to the secretive nonprofit
groups.”); Sean Sullivan, What Is a 501(c)(4), Anyway?, WASH. POST (May 13, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/13/what-is-a-501c4-anyway
[https://perma.cc/V5XJ-4EZK] (explaining the “key difference” is that “[s]uper PACs must disclose their
donors while 501(c)(4)s do not. If you are a donor looking to influence [an] election but do not want to
reveal your identity, the 501(c)(4) is an attractive option through which to send your cash.”); see also
Sugin, supra note 2, at 897–98 (arguing for states to intervene in the regulation of 501(c)(4) organizations
to protect the charitable sector).
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penalty upon a social welfare organization for serving as a foreign conduit.27
Because nonprofit organizations are shielded from revealing sources of
campaign donations and the use of dark money donations has grown
substantially,28 this Essay examines the possibility that illegal donations from
foreign sources have previously—or could in the future—illegally fund
domestic campaigns without reporting or public knowledge. It examines
potential legal responses that might ensure accountability and deter
misconduct if a hypothetical 501(c)(4) organization intentionally or
unintentionally allowed itself to be used as a conduit for foreign funds to
support U.S. political campaigns. These could be pursued either by federal
authorities—utilizing election laws, money-laundering statutes, or tax law—
or state authorities—using state nonprofit laws standing alone or in
conjunction with other proscriptions.
II. EXPLORATIONS OF LIABILITY
Can federal and state authorities hold nonprofits culpable as entities and
hold their management and board responsible for illegal donations? What are
the fiduciary duties of officers, directors, and staff of nonprofit organizations
with respect to monitoring the funds they receive and the campaign activities
in which they engage? Is there civil or criminal liability for a board member
who fails to diligently monitor—or is willfully ignorant of—donations to
their nonprofit that come directly or indirectly from a foreign terrorist,
criminal, or state-supported foreign entity and are contributed to political
campaigns? These questions are important in order to understand whether
existing rules are adequate to promote fair elections and police nonprofit
welfare organizations.
Suppose investigations by the FBI, FEC, or a state attorney general
acting independently, reveal that senior staff and board members of a
501(c)(4) nonprofit organization assisted a foreign terrorist or a criminal
organization by recklessly or intentionally permitting the organization to be
a conduit for unlawful contributions. Or suppose the organization has itself
engaged in campaign activities using foreign funds. What potential legal
perils would confront the organization and its officers, directors, donors, and
staff? This Part addresses three potential sources of law to confront illegal
27

Investigations of 501(c)(4) welfare organizations that did not result in assessments would not be
disclosed by the IRS or FEC over email with the author or in telephone conversations with a Northwestern
Law Review Associate Editor. See Email from Cecilia Barreda, IRS Media Relations, to Norman Silber
(Sept. 5, 2019, 01:21 EST) (email on file with author).
28
Anna Massoglia, State of Money in Politics: Billion-Dollar ‘Dark Money’ Spending Is Just the Tip
of the Iceberg, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/02/somp3billion-dollar-dark-money-tip-of-the-iceberg [https://perma.cc/CYH8-R3QT] (charting growth in
partially disclosed and undisclosed funding).
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donations and their shortcomings: (1) election law; (2) criminal money
laundering statutes; and (3) IRS authority.
A. Federal Election Law
Federal election laws fail adequately to discourage social welfare
organizations from accepting unlawful foreign contributions. Consider first
the nature of the civil and criminal violations of the election laws.
Contributions by foreign nationals to U.S. political campaigns are prohibited
by federal election law and are subject to civil and criminal penalties.29
Contributions to political campaigns by prohibited foreign parties in the
name of another person are treated identically and are subject to the same
penalties.30 Knowingly accepting foreign contributions is also prohibited and
subject to criminal and civil penalties.31 Furthermore, laundering campaign
contributions through conduits and straw donors is “persuasive evidence of
the Act’s willful intent element.”32

29

Prohibition on Contributions, Donations, Expenditures, Independent Expenditures, and
Disbursements by Foreign Nationals, 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(b) (2016) provides: “A foreign national shall
not, directly or indirectly, make a contribution or a donation of money or other thing of value, or expressly
or impliedly promise to make a contribution or a donation, in connection with any Federal, State, or local
election.” Paragraph (c) prohibits contributions or donations to “a political committee of a political party,
including a national party committee, a national congressional campaign committee, or a State, district or
local party committee . . . .” Paragraph (e) prohibits disbursements by foreign nationals for electioneering
communications. Paragraph (f) prohibits knowing solicitation, acceptance, or receipt from a foreign
national of any prohibited contribution or donation. Paragraph (g) is titled “Solicitation, acceptance, or
receipt of contributions and donations from foreign nationals,” and provides: “No person shall knowingly
solicit, accept, or receive from a foreign national any contribution or donation prohibited by paragraphs
(b) through (d) of this section.” Paragraph (j) prohibits direct or indirect donations to an inaugural
committee and knowing acceptance of a donation to an inaugural committee. 11 C.F.R. § 111.24(a)(2)
(2016) establishes relatively modest monetary civil penalties for knowing and willful violations. The
Department of Justice has concurrent criminal jurisdiction and has criminally prosecuted individuals for
violating this prohibition on foreign political contributions. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Yes. Violating
Certain Campaign Finance Laws Is a Criminal Offense, MOYERS (July 13, 2017),
https://billmoyers.com/story/violating-certain-campaign-finance-laws-criminal-offenses/
[https://perma.cc/63FP-9K9F]. The section applies to both federal and non-federal elections.
30
52 U.S.C. § 30122 (2012) (“No person shall make a contribution in the name of another person or
knowingly permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution, and no person shall knowingly accept
a contribution made by one person in the name of another person.”).
31
Id. As this Essay indicates, state law director fiduciary standards for determining misconduct
would be less demanding. See infra notes 70–73.
32
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 141 (Richard C. Pilger ed., 8th ed. 2017). In the
context of domestic contributions of campaign funds, federal election regulations prohibit state political
campaign committees from serving as laundering conduits to “circumvent” limits on “soft money.” See
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 160 (2003) (“Nonprofit advocacy corporations are . . . no less
susceptible than traditional business companies to misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution
limits imposed on individuals.”); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 162 (2003), partially
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (“The core of § 323(b) [now 52 U.S.C.S.
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The statute enabling the FEC to enforce the prohibition on foreign
contributions, however, includes a remarkably stringent test for establishing
that a nonprofit actor knowingly accepted an illegal contribution.33 In
contrast to a test that would permit reasonable inferences to be drawn, the
liability of a recipient will be triggered only if there is “[a]ctual knowledge
that the funds have come from a foreign national; [a]wareness of certain facts
that would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a substantial
probability that the money is from a foreign national; or [a]wareness of facts
that should have prompted a reasonable inquiry into whether the source of
funds is a foreign national.”34
There is, additionally, a safe harbor: If the nonprofit obtains copies of a
donor’s current and valid U.S. passport, then, unless the defendant is proved
to have “actual knowledge that the source of the funds solicited, accepted, or
received is a foreign national,” there will be insufficient proof of intent to
satisfy the culpability standard.35 There is furthermore no requirement for a
501(c)(4) publicly to divulge the names of its donors, which might help in
an effort to establish a nexus between a foreign contributor and an entity.36
§ 30125] is a straightforward contribution regulation: It prevents donors from contributing nonfederal
funds to state and local party committees to help finance ‘Federal election activity.’”).
33
11 C.F.R § 110.20 (prohibiting contributions, donations, expenditures, independent expenditures,
and disbursements by foreign nationals); Who Can and Can’t Contribute, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cantcontribute [https://perma.cc/Y2S3-QYVN]; see text infra at note 34.
34
Who Can and Can’t Contribute, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 33. 11 C.F.R § 110.20
further provides that a recipient should decline a gift in circumstances such as where the contributor uses
a foreign passport for identification purposes or provides a foreign address; or if the contribution is made
from a foreign bank; or the contributor or donor resides abroad, and the written justification for the
regulation states that the third prong of the standard establishes, “in effect willful blindness.” 67 Fed. Reg.
69,928, 69,941 (Nov. 19, 2002) (codified at 11 C.F.R § 110.20) is applicable to situations in which a
known fact should have prompted a reasonable inquiry, but did not. But the safe harbor in 11 C.F.R
§ 110.20(a)(7) provides that a person has conducted a reasonable inquiry if he or she seeks and obtains
copies of current and valid U.S. passport papers unless he or she has “actual knowledge that the source
of the funds solicited, accepted, or received is a foreign national.” 11 C.F.R § 110.20(a)(7).
35
Id.
36
A 501(c)(4) organization is not required by federal tax or election law publicly to divulge campaign
fund donors or recipients. See Gene Takagi, Treasury Eliminates Donor Information Disclosures by
501(c)(4)
and
501(c)(6)
Organizations,
NEO
L.
GROUP
(July
16,
2018),
http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/treasury-eliminates-donor-information-disclosures-by-501c4-and501c6-organizations [https://perma.cc/X3AK-6SDK]. At the time of the 2016 presidential campaign,
however, the names of donors were required to be reported to the IRS confidentially. The confidentiality
of records of the board meetings of nonprofit organizations, which according to the organization’s
governing documents are definable as confidential, as well as lists of members and donors, unless subject
to open meetings laws, will be enforced. Such material, however, is subject to subpoena by appropriate
law enforcement and regulatory officers in appropriate circumstances. State laws requiring the
submission of donor lists by nonprofits has been upheld. See, e.g., Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra,
903 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he California Attorney General’s Schedule B requirement,
which obligates charities to submit the very information they already file each year with the IRS, survives
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As a further observation, it should be noted that the likelihood of detection
and prosecution is further inhibited by the fact that nothing in the federal
election law specifically prohibits a foreign person or entity from making a
general gift to a nonprofit.37 Subsequent to receipt of a gift by a foreign
source to general funds, a nonprofit—money being fungible—might
reallocate other general funds toward campaign activities without being
noticed or readily traced.
If, however, a nonprofit were so reckless, unreasonable, and devoid of
sound legal advice as to use foreign-sourced funds to make donations to
political campaigns, steer around the safe harbor, and knowingly and directly
place foreign contributions into an account dedicated to the support of a
political campaign, then the FEC or the Justice Department, or both, might
find a violation and pursue relatively limited civil fines, or potentially bring
more serious criminal charges under the statute.38 In short, federal election
law regulations are evadable and do not effectively deter misconduct by a
nonprofit determined to facilitate illegality.
B. Federal and State Criminal Money-Laundering Statutes
Criminal money-laundering statutes are ill-equipped to address this
problem as well. If it were determined that a nonprofit organization or its
senior officers or directors intentionally converted the proceeds of “some
form of unlawful activity” so that the donated funds appeared to be coming
from lawful sources, then federal and state money-laundering statutes might
be invoked.39 A federal conviction for money laundering can result in fines
of up to $500,000, or double the amount of money that was laundered,
whichever is greater.40 New York has also established money-laundering
offenses denominated from the fourth degree to the first degree.41 Other
exacting scrutiny as applied to the plaintiffs because it is substantially related to an important state interest
in policing charitable fraud.”); Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2018)
(rejecting the claim that requiring nonprofit organizations to disclose their donors on a yearly basis
violates the First Amendment). But see Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 458–59 (1958) (denying the state a subpoena to obtain NAACP records, including
membership lists).
37
11 C.F.R § 110.20 (b)–(j) prohibit enumerated electioneering and political contributions by
foreign nationals. The regulation does not limit foreign persons or entities from making general gifts to a
nonprofit.
38
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES, supra note 32, at 138.
39
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2016) (imposing civil penalties and/or imprisonment on those who knowingly
conduct or attempt to conduct a financial transaction, or transfer, involving unlawful proceeds); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957 (2016) (mandating punishment for those who knowingly engage or attempt to engage in a
monetary transaction involving criminally derived property in excess of $10,000, and the offense either
occurs within the jurisdiction of the United States, or the defendant is a person of the United States).
40
§ 1956(a)(1)–(2).
41
A person is guilty of money laundering in the fourth degree when,
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major nonprofit jurisdictions, including California, Massachusetts, and
Florida, have also established statutes to punish money-laundering
offenses.42
Under both federal and New York state statutes, it would be futile to
argue that a monetary gift transformed sums of money into illegal proceeds.43
The elements of the offense require that the laundering recipient knows that
the funds are the proceeds of felonious activity, and in many jurisdictions
specified types of felonious criminal conduct.44 In short, perhaps the donated
foreign-source sums themselves derived from illegal sources, but unless it

Knowing that the property involved in one or more financial transactions represents the proceeds
of criminal conduct he or she conducts one or more such financial transactions which in fact involve
the proceeds of specified criminal conduct with intent to: promote the carrying on of criminal
conduct or engage in conduct constituting a felony . . . [under tax law]; or knowing that the
transaction or transactions in whole or in part are designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of criminal conduct; or avoid any
transaction reporting requirement imposed by law . . . .
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.05–.20 (2019) (internal sectioning omitted). Failing to report income derived
from criminal activity in a material manner can be a felony under federal tax law. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206
(2012); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012).
42
In California, for example, an individual may be found guilty of money laundering when: (1) the
individual completed a transaction or series of transactions through at least one financial institution; (2)
the total amount of the transaction(s) is more than $5,000 or a total value exceeding $25,000 within a 30day period; and (3) the transaction(s) was made with the intent to promote criminal activity or the
individual knew that the funds involved were the proceeds of criminal activity. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 186.10 (West 2019). Massachusetts imposes penalties for money laundering on those who,
knowingly transport[] or possess[] a monetary instrument or other property that was derived from
criminal activity with the intent to promote, carry on or facilitate criminal activity [or knowingly]
engage[] in a transaction involving a monetary instrument or other property known to be derived
from criminal activity with the intent to promote, carry on or facilitate criminal activity . . . .
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 267A, § 2 (2019) (internal sectioning omitted). The Florida Money Laundering
Act states in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for a person [k]nowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, to conduct or attempt to conduct such a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity: [w]ith the intent to
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or [k]nowing that the transaction is designed
in whole or in part [t]o conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . .
FLA. STAT. § 896.101 (2011) (internal sectioning omitted).
43
See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MONEY LAUNDERING: AN OVERVIEW OF
18 U.S.C. 1956 AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2012); 2101. Money Laundering Overview,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2101-money-launderingoverview [https://perma.cc/AMD8-VCEN].
44
See supra note 43. Similar to other leading jurisdictions, New York Penal Law requires that the
individual possess knowledge of the proceeds’ illegal source. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.05–.20.
Additionally, to impose money-laundering penalties pursuant to the United States Code, the individual
must be aware, or know, that the funds are derived from an illegal source. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57
(2012).

116

114:104 (2019)

Foreign Corruption of the Political Process

can be established that the donated funds were the product of criminal
activity, and that the nonprofit organization or its officers or directors could
be charged with intentional criminal conduct, the nonprofit and its officers
and directors would not be subject to money-laundering penalties.45
C. Internal Revenue Service Authority
Penalties potentially imposed by the FEC and the Justice Department
would be the beginning of the story of federal enforcement. But what about
the IRS? If a penalty is assessed against a nonprofit by the FEC, or an audit
by the IRS reveals unlawful expenditures, how might the IRS hold
accountable such a nonprofit and discourage future misconduct?
Crucial for understanding of the IRS’s accountability problem is an
appreciation of the distinctions between the treatment of 501(c)(3) charitable
organizations and a 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. Section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code allows “insubstantial” political activity and
absolutely forbids political campaigning; Internal Revenue Code
Section 4955 further imposes a series of graduated taxes on an offending
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization and on managers who make “political
expenditures.”46
In the case of 501(c)(4) organizations, the regime is different. Unlike
501(c)(3) groups who cannot engage in campaigning, 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations are entitled—by regulatory and judicial
interpretation—to engage in as much non-campaign related political activity
as they choose, provided it is not the “primary” activity of the organization;
furthermore, like 501(c)(3) groups, social welfare organizations can accept
foreign donations and deploy them for nonpolitical and advocacy purposes.47
45

See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 470.05–.20; 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
The tax in Section 4955 is on “any amount paid or incurred by a section 501(c)(3) organization in
any participation in, or intervention in (including the publication or distribution of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 4955(d)(1) (2012). The amount of the tax is initially a percentage of the amount spent, and it is
supplemented dramatically by additional taxes if there is no recovery of the amount spent and no
safeguards against future misbehavior established. § 4955(a)–(c).
47
Social Welfare organizations classified as 501(c)(4)s must operate “primarily” to serve social
welfare, and contributions to these groups are not tax-deductible. The maximum amount of political
activity social welfare organizations may engage in before political campaigning becomes their “primary”
activity is unspecified. See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332, 1981 WL 166125; see also Aprill, supra
note 2, at 43 n.2; Johnny Rex Buckles, Curbing (or Not) Foreign Influence on United States Politics and
Policies Through the Federal Taxation of Charities, 79 MD. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (exploring
the lawful yet questionable means by which foreign actors are permitted to influence domestic political
campaigns with contributions to nonprofit organizations). In contrast, Internal Revenue Code Section 527
organizations specifically engage in political campaigning, and their campaign expenditures are also
shielded from taxation, but their donor lists are public and their non-campaign activities are restricted.
See 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2012).
46
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In addition, while it is true that 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations—
as well as 501(c)(5) labor and agricultural organizations and 501(c)(6)
business league organizations—face a tax similar to the tax faced by
501(c)(3) organizations on expenditures that “influenc[e] or attempt[] to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any State or local public office or office in a . . . political
organization,” the disciplinary impact of this tax breaks down. This
breakdown is due to the authorization for 501(c)(4) organizations to establish
“segregated funds,” closely resembling FEC “Political Action Committees,”
which may collect and spend funds on political campaign-intervention free
of the tax on exempt expenditures.48 The wisdom of permitting this escape
hatch has been contested, but it stands as the law.49 Thus, supposing that
foreign illegal activity is engaged in by means of a 501(c)(4)’s segregated
fund, there appears to be no directly applicable intermediate sanction—the
Internal Revenue Code does not provide for excise taxes on social welfare
organizations that knowingly or recklessly engage in impermissible political
activity.50

Because donations to 501(c)(3) organizations are tax deductible but donations to 501(c)(4)
organizations are not, an incentive exists to donate to 501(c)(3) organizations, which will transfer amounts
of money that are not “substantial” to 501(c)(4) organizations in to attempt to influence legislation.
Charities funding affiliated social welfare organizations must therefore strictly condition gifts above the
“insubstantial” on use for charitable purposes only. There is no precise definition of “substantial.” As one
court has explained, “[a]lthough there is no statutory or regulatory definition of what constitutes a
‘substantial part’ of an organization’s activities, courts have found that less than 5% of an organization’s
activity is not substantial, while over 16.6% is substantial.” United Food & Commer. Workers Local 99
v. Brewer, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 2011) (comparing Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907 (6th
Cir. 1955) with Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146 (Ct. Cl. 1974)). Only if an organization
makes a 501(h) election is there a formula to determine the precise permissible amount of a funds transfer
to a 501(c)(4). See The Powerful, Free, and Easy 501(h) Election: Benefits Galore!, NAT’L COUNCIL
NONPROFITS,
https://alliancefornevadanonprofits.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/501h.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6X2W-5FGT]. Continuing with the hypothetical example of the 501(c)(3) NRA
Foundation, it did not make a 501(h) election in the 2016 fiscal tax year and so its permissible lobbying
expenses are those allowed under the ambiguous “substantial” amount test. The NRA Foundation
transferred at least $206 million to the NRA since 2010. See Danny Hakim, At the N.R.A., a Cash
Machine, Sputtering, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/nrafinances-executives-board-members.html [https://perma.cc/5KR7-NQNV] (analyzing NRA tax records).
48
§ 527(e)(5)(A). Compare § 527(f)(3) with § 4955 (allowing for graduated taxes on offending
501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations who engage in political campaigning or make political expenditures).
See also Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by
Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1077–78, 1078 n.40 (2007).
49
See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. See generally Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare
and Political Organizations: Ending the Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481
(2018).
50
See § 527 (failing to mandate, or specify, excise taxes for social welfare organizations engaging
in illegal political activities).
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The principal reason for the passage of intermediate sanctions that
affect penalties for misconduct by private foundations and 501(c)(3) public
charities was to empower the IRS to impose an effective and calibrated
disincentive against misbehavior rather than having to destroy an entity
entirely by revoking its exempt status. Yet absent from the tax code is an
analogous provision that would impose a tax on social welfare organizations
that violate federal election campaign expenditure laws, as well as on their
culpable managers and board members, including for violations of 52 U.S.
Code Section 30121, which covers “contributions and donations by foreign
nationals.”51 Such a rule would do more to deter minor violations than can
be done under present tax law.52
Without authority to sanction the board or its individual members, the
IRS could consider other approaches. Illegal foreign contributions—whether
classified as unrelated business income, gifts, or otherwise—would
constitute income that a nonprofit would need to report accurately.53 It would
be unlawful not to report the income or pay any tax that is due on it. If hidden
donations went unreported and were characterizable as unrelated business
income, for example, that intentional mischaracterization or under-reporting
could jeopardize an organization’s tax exemption.54 That being said, a
sophisticated nonprofit organization that is determined to operate as a
conduit for foreign funds or to acquiesce in their receipt would probably

51

See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012).
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, “The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion”: Should the IRS Change or
Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 100 (2016) (noting that
increased penalties would enhance compliance if the organization or its members are aware of the costs
and risks of noncompliance).
53
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) (embezzled funds must be included in the gross
income of the embezzler); 26 C.F.R. § 1.61–14 (2019) (“Illegal gains constitute gross income.”). Money
acquired through illegal means must be reported and taxed. Income from illegal activities must be
included as income on Form 1040, line 21. Form 990 attaches great importance to reporting unrelated
business income. In its guidance about gaming operations, for example, the Service states that:
52

IRC Section 501(c)(4) organizations promote social welfare. Gaming is considered both a business
and a recreational activity; it does not ordinarily promote social welfare. If it is the primary activity
of a social welfare organization, it may jeopardize the organization’s exempt status. If not a primary
activity, the gaming income will be UBTI unless an exclusion or exception applies.
Exempt Organization Gaming and Unrelated Business Taxable Income, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar.
26,
2019),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exempt-organization-gaming-and-unrelatedbusiness-taxable-income [https://perma.cc/EH8W-U74Z].
54
Organizations classified as 501(c)(4)s must complete IRS Form 990 and complete Schedule C,
parts I and III if they engage in lobbying and campaign activities. Schedule C requires that the
organization provide a description of direct and indirect campaign activities and political campaign
political expenditures. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
SCHEDULE C (FORM 990 OR 990-EZ) (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990sc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2T2-EM5L].
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report a foreign-sourced contribution as a gift for purposes unrelated to the
support of any political campaign.55
The IRS could try to revoke the tax-exempt status of the nonprofit for
failing to meet its “operational mandate.”56 When an organization does not
operate in ways that serve its mission, its status must be revoked.57 This
failure occurs in mundane situations, such as by the neglect to complete
informational returns, or, more unusually, by a deviation from a stated taxexempt purpose. This happened, for instance, to an association of war
veterans which failed to have sufficient war veterans as members.58 Notably,
in June 2018, the IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of Americans for Job
Security, a tax-exempt 501(c)(6) business league which spent millions of
dollars influencing elections but failed to file its tax returns for three years.
However, it was the failure to file, rather than the political activity itself,
which formed the basis for the revocation.59
While the general proposition that revocation is a viable option in
appropriate circumstances is a sound one, the possibility that the IRS would
revoke the tax-exempt status of a large, powerful, national nonprofit social
welfare organization with thousands of members that was not found guilty
of an FEC violation seems remote. If an incumbent political administration
had received considerable support from and had strong links to the nonprofit
advocacy organization, the imposition of a drastic penalty would be
theoretical at best—even if members of the board confessed to engaging in

55
See e.g., United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that FEC
reporting regulations require the true source of conduit contributions be reported following accusations
that the defendants were funneling illegally disguised foreign campaign funds into national and state
political committees and filing false reports with the FEC).
56
See Revoked? Reinstated? Learn More, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 24, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/automatic-revocation-of-exemption [https://perma.cc/PP4H7WA2] (explaining that the IRS automatically revokes an organization’s tax-exempt status when it fails
to file Form 990, 990-EZ, 990-PF or Form 990-N for three consecutive years).
57
Failing an “organizational” test, which focuses on governing documents out of compliance with
nonprofit taxation and governance requirements, would jeopardize tax-exempt status. So, too, would
failing to provide sufficient community benefits. However, the IRS has provided minimal guidance about
how low the level of benefit would need to be. See Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption Under
Section 501(c)(4) 9–11 (May 2014) (Urb. Inst. Tax Pol’y & Charities Project, unpublished working
paper), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22661/413152-The-Tax-Exemption-UnderSection--c-.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y3E4-E57X].
58
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9315002 (Nov. 5, 1992); see also Tax Exempt Organization Search
(Formerly Select Check), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (July 2, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/tax-exempt-organization-search [https://perma.cc/97Q8-2K6Y].
59
See William Gray, IRS Revokes Dark Money Group Americans for Job Security’s Tax Exempt
Status, ISSUEONE (June 12, 2018), https://www.issueone.org/irs-revokes-dark-money-group-americansfor-job-securitys-tax-exempt-status [https://perma.cc/7NJ5-5FWP].
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illegal conduct.60 The possibility that the IRS might revoke the exemption of
an affiliate would be somewhat greater.61
III. EXPLORATIONS OF LIABILITY UNDER STATE LAW
Imagine that an investigation reveals illegal conduit activity, or that
foreign individuals have been convicted of interfering with an election with
the willing or careless assistance of a nonprofit—what might a state attorney
general do? Using New York as an example, this Part first addresses the
power state attorneys general have over nonprofit organizations. It then
examines viable theories for establishing accountability, including claims
based on duties of obedience and duties of care. Finally, it examines the
available remedies for FEC violations, and the imposed limitations.
A. The Powers of State Attorneys General
In the major jurisdiction of New York, as in other states, the Attorney
General is responsible for supervising charitable organizations and has broad
independent authority to monitor and investigate nonprofit activities.62 She
60
A confession of guilt for engaging in illegal campaign activity would, of course, substantially
overcome difficulties in establishing culpability noted in Part II.C above; conduct of illegal activity is a
substantial bar to exemption under IRC 501(c)(4). Engaging in illegal activity may result in a revocation
of an organization’s tax-exempt status, since such activity is contrary to the organization’s operational
mandate or mission of social welfare. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., J. Activities That Are Illegal Or
Contrary To Public Policy, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE)
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985 (1985), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopicj85.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6FZ-AVT4] (“Illegal activities, which violate the minimum
standards of acceptable conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society, are contrary to the
common good and the general welfare of the people of the community and thus are not permissible means
of promoting social welfare for purposes of IRC 501(c)(4).”); see also Publication 557 (01/2019), TaxExempt Status for Your Organization, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p557 [https://perma.cc/9H9N-D3B5] (“If, to carry out its program, an
organization violates applicable canons of ethics, disrupts the judicial system, or engages in an illegal
action, the organization will jeopardize its exemption.”); Eric C. Surette, Construction and Application
of Federal Regulations Governing Retroactive Revocation of Tax-Exempt Status, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art.
5 (2017) (discussing cases in which courts applied or construed federal regulations governing retroactive
revocation of tax-exempt status). See generally Partners in Charity, Inc. v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 151, 161–
63 (2013) (describing revocation of 501(c)(3)).
61
In our hypothetical case, a foreign donor under existing law could state that it donated to the social
welfare organization for general political purposes but not campaign intervention purposes—but whether
it in fact did so would be a question of fact. Any claim that it was for general purposes and that receipt of
funds was not intended to offset larger campaign contributions would not need to be taken at face value
by the IRS or an attorney general.
62
See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Att’y Gen. Underwood Announces Lawsuit
Against Donald J. Trump Found. and its Bd. of Dirs. for Extensive and Persistent Violations of State and
Fed. Law (June 14, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-underwood-announceslawsuit-against-donald-j-trump-foundation-and-its [https://perma.cc/7M4C-NC9E]; Building Better
Charities, ILL. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/charities [https://perma.cc/XS8LB2AG] (“Under Illinois law, fundraisers and charitable organizations are required to register each year
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is the state’s chief legal officer, and as such, “the guardian of the legal rights
of [its] citizens . . . its organizations and its natural resources” with subpoena
powers.63 The Attorney General also enforces the election law statutes of the
state.64
With respect to an attorney general’s supervisory authority, her
concerns are primarily about overseeing the mission accomplishments of
nonprofits and monitoring the governance responsibility of directors and
officers. In the hypothetical scenario above, assume that the social welfare
organization itself has violated its mission by serving as a conduit; that some
of its fiduciaries intentionally made or knew of false statements or omissions
on federal and/or state tax returns; and that some senior managers and board
members either knew or willfully were ignorant of foreign donations that
were intended to enlarge the amount of the nonprofit’s political campaign
contributions. Under these circumstances, an attorney general could
pursue—well within the scope of her authority—a multiplicity of causes of
action.
B. Contrasting Objectives for Enforcement
The New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law is directed, as stated, at
ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of nonprofit governance.65 The FEC
rules are, quite naturally, directed at a distinctly different objective: they are
principally about promoting the integrity and functionality of the election
with the Attorney General’s office.”); Charities, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://oag.ca.gov/charities [https://perma.cc/JL76-QWL2] (“The purpose of this oversight is to protect
charitable assets for their intended use and ensure that the charitable donations contributed by
Californians are not misapplied and squandered through fraud or other means.”); The Attorney General’s
Non-Profit Organizations/Public Charities Division, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/orgs/theattorney-generals-non-profit-organizationspublic-charities-division
[https://perma.cc/NU65-ZCJA]
(“The Non-Profit Organizations/Public Charities Division is responsible for overseeing more than 23,000
public charities in Massachusetts.”).
63
Divisions and Bureaus, N.Y. ST. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/bureaus
[https://perma.cc/M8QS-M36F].
64
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3–104 (McKinney 2018); see also Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., A.G.
Underwood Announces Election Day Hotline to Protect Voter Access During Tuesday’s Gen. Election
(Nov. 5, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-underwood-announces-election-day-hotline-protectvoter-access-during-tuesdays [https://perma.cc/XY9K-54XA]. The hypothetical does not suppose that
the nonprofit organization corrupted state elections.
65
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2014) (“[A] corporation of any kind to which
this chapter applies shall conduct no activities for pecuniary profit or financial gain, whether or not in
furtherance of its corporate purposes, except to the extent that such activity supports its other lawful
activities then being conducted.”). This law places great emphasis on good faith dealings. See N.Y. NOTFOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 552(b) (McKinney 2014) (“In addition to complying with the duty of
loyalty . . . each person responsible for managing and investing an institutional fund shall manage and
invest the fund in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances.”).
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process, or, according to some FEC commissioners, about encouraging free
and abundant political speech.66 The FEC test, which must be met to establish
culpability for “knowing receipt” of foreign campaign funds,67 including its
safe harbor, aligns more consistently with FEC objectives in promoting the
ease and efficiency with which candidates for federal office can raise funds,
than it does with evaluating the mission orientation and integrity of a
nonprofit. In short, an inquiry by a state attorney general into a nonprofit’s
behavior in concealing and misusing foreign-source income would spring
from a different predicate, consider different statutory provisions, and use a
different calculus for measuring wrongdoing than would be triggered by an
FEC investigation.68
C. New York as an Illustration
New York is home to a large array of charitable organizations, and New
York state law illustrates the latitude available to attorneys general to pursue
officers and directors. Section 112(a) of the New York Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law authorizes the Attorney General to take actions and bring
special proceedings, including derivative actions, against nonprofit
organizations that violate their mission.69

66
Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-history
[https://perma.cc/RT87-F3H3] (stating FEC mission is “[t]o protect the integrity of the federal campaign
finance process by providing transparency and fairly enforcing and administering federal campaign
finance laws”); see also Trevor Potter, Money, Politics, and the Crippling of the FEC: A Symposium on
the Federal Election Commission’s Arguable Inability to Effectively Regulate Money in American
Elections, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 447, 450 (2017) (ideological differences over the interpretation of the law,
capture by the major political parties, and deadlock prevent adequate enforcement); Dave Levinthal,
Another Massive Problem with U.S. Democracy: The FEC is Broken, ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/another-massive-problem-with-us-democracythe-fec-is-broken/282404 [https://perma.cc/5BSQ-VBEX] (“The Republicans, led by McGahn, insisted
the agency should above all ensure the free speech rights of political actors—rights they believe should
include the raising and spending of big money to either promote or lambaste political candidates.”); see
also infra Part IV.
67
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
68
See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 992 (2004) (“[T]he broad interests of the Attorney General necessarily
entail protecting the public against any social and economic disadvantages which may be occasioned by
the activities and functioning of public charities . . . .”) (internal footnote and quotation omitted).
69
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112(a) (McKinney 2014). The specified actions include: “(1)
To annul the corporate existence or dissolve a corporation that has acted beyond its capacity or power or
to restrain it from carrying on unauthorized activities; (2) To annul the corporate existence or dissolve
any corporation that has not been duly formed; . . . (4) To procure a judgment removing a director of a
corporation for cause under section 706 (Removal of directors); (5) To dissolve a corporation under
article 11 (Judicial dissolution); . . . (7) To enforce any right given under this chapter to members, a
director or an officer of a charitable corporation. The attorney-general shall have the same status as such
members, director or officer.” Id.
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A state attorney general’s investigation would focus on whether officers
and board members of a nonprofit violated duties of obedience—duties
recognized under common law as separate causes of action in New York—
and duties of care.70 Such an exploration would include—but would not
necessarily be limited to—the identical conduct evaluated by the FEC, yet
would not necessarily be confined by the standards applied by FEC
regulations.
The duty of obedience requires that the board work to ensure that the
organization complies with applicable laws and regulations, acts in
accordance with its own policies, carries out its mission appropriately, and
does not engage in unauthorized activities.71 A board member or officer who
condoned or acquiesced to the use of accounting misrepresentations made to
conceal the real source of funds; or who concealed or willfully ignored the
true purpose of a foreign gift ostensibly donated for general mission
purposes; or who reallocated expenses from a mission-related activity to a
political campaign contribution after becoming aware of a sudden infusion
of foreign-source funds without inquiring into its purpose, would
simultaneously undermine respect for law, aid in the corruption of the
democratic process, and jeopardize the mission of an organization.
The duty of care requires directors to act “in good faith and with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances.”72 Assume that a substantial gift of foreign funds was

70
Brody, supra note 68, at 948 (“In carrying out its supervisory role, the attorney general (or other
designated state official), can investigate charges of improper charitable activities, view books and
records, and subpoena witnesses.”). Following an investigation, the attorney general has the authority to
impose reform mechanisms rather than call for punishment. Id. (“Reform rather than punishment is
generally the goal of the charity regulator, and board members as well prefer a chance to improve their
behavior while avoiding embarrassment and personal liability.”).
71
See Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 186 Misc. 2d 126, 152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
72
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717 (2019); see Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State,
806 N.Y.S.2d 99, 118 (N.Y. 2005) (holding business judgment rule does not apply where nonprofit
directors breached duty of care); Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 106 (1918) (holding duty of care
breached by failure to monitor excessive lending because “[n]o custom or practice can make a directorship
a mere position of honor void of responsibility, or cause a name to become a substitute for care and
attention”); S.H. and Helen R. Scheuer Family Found., Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 179 A.D.2d 65, 70 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (holding business judgment rule would be inapplicable to protect directors if a sizeable
majority of the board “failed to possess the independence and disinterested status which is a prerequisite
to insulation from [the rule]”); Epiphany Cmty. Nursery Sch. v. Levey, No. 654655/2016, 2017 N.Y. Slip
Op. 31668(U) at 11, 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2017), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
(explaining that a director breaches the duty of care by a “‘sustained or systematic failure . . . to exercise
oversight’ over the corporation’s activities” and holding duty of care was violated by manager who failed
to spot “indicia” of fraudulent financial dealings which “were so glaring and flagrant that ‘even the most
novice of accountants’ would have recognized and ‘objected to’ them,” and “[n]o reasonably prudent
director could miss the fact that her husband was siphoning millions of dollars . . .”); Schneiderman v.
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donated to a nonprofit social welfare organization for general activity
purposes, and that a segregated campaign fund account simultaneously
increased by some corresponding or commensurate amount. In this case, a
reasonably prudent director who is aware of these facts may be obligated to
take further steps: to use due diligence to become knowledgeable of the
affairs of the organization, to inquire further, and to be competently assured
that donated foreign funds were not intended to offset increased campaign
expenditures by the organization.73 A board failing to exercise due diligence
to identify the true purpose of a massive foreign gift, or worse, deciding to
increase its campaign contributions because of a windfall foreign gift, has
violated its duty of care.
D. Factors at Play in the Application of Remedies
A 501(c)(4) organization which attempted to defend itself by asserting
that foreign contributions were purely made as general activity gifts would
face considerable difficulty if facts demonstrated that it retained the
contributed funds for its own general activity and operating purposes and
then spent money previously allocated for general purposes on campaign
donations, thereby violating FEC rules. The IRS might, conceivably,
characterize the transfers themselves as part of a conspiracy to violate
election laws or as bribes.74 The manager or executive director of a campaign
fund in this hypothetical also would have negligently violated fiduciary
duties of care and obedience by failing to operate the fund in good faith and
as a reasonably prudent person would.

Lower Esopus River Watch, Inc., 975 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (adherence is required “to basic
fiduciary duties . . . includ[ing] the duty of care”).
73
See supra note 72. If board members—or those upon whom they are entitled to rely—are revealed
to know or be willfully ignorant of a large contribution made directly or indirectly by a foreign contributor
intended to result in larger contributions being made to political campaigns, the primary element of
culpability for a breach of the duty of care will be established. Directors have a duty to be appropriately
informed. See People v. Grasso, No. 401620/04, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 52019(U) at 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 8,
2006), aff’d as modified, 54 A.D.3d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[T]he Court is acknowledging the
fundamental duty of each member of a board to understand the business of the company upon whose
board they sit.”); People v. Cent. Fish Co., 101 N.Y.S. 1108 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907). Nonprofit directors,
especially those who serve on audit committees, are responsible for ensuring that major gifts are
appropriately accounted for and properly spent on mission activities. See, e.g., Gift Acceptance, Counting
and
Reporting,
CARNEGIE
MELLON
U.,
https://www.cmu.edu/policies/forms-anddocuments/Gift%20Acceptance%20Counting%20and%20Reporting%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD3E-PT2L] (representative policy for gift acceptance, counting, and reporting).
74
Misreporting bribes as gifts can lead to criminal prosecution for tax fraud conspiracy. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Att’ys Office, Arrests Made in Nationwide College Admissions
Scam: Alleged Exam Cheating & Athletic Recruitment Scheme (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/arrests-made-nationwide-college-admissions-scam-alleged-examcheating-athletic [https://perma.cc/9ZNW-TVQ7].
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Per Section 112 of the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, the
standard for annulling the corporate existence of a nonprofit is not specified
by the statute or established by caselaw.75 If it could be proven that the
nonprofit became involved in concealing foreign contributions; engaged in
fraudulent accounting; significantly corrupted an election and undermined
public faith in the election process; and diminished the chances for success
of candidates whose views conflicted with the interests of the nonprofit, then
surely these would be sufficient causes to justify annulment.76
Beyond annulment, proceedings could be initiated by the Attorney
General to remove complicit board members and hold them personally liable
for acting in bad faith. Mandating a new election would be beyond the
authority of the Attorney General but she could, on tort principles, pursue
monetary judgments against responsible officers and directors and against
the entity itself, which might be calculated, in theory, according to the
provable actual damages to the citizens of the state, enhanced by a punitive
amount with a deterrent additur.77
Establishing the personal liability of managers and board members
would require showing that they personally breached their duty of care or
obedience, or “aided and abetted” a breach of a fiduciary duty.78 Individual
corporate directors and officers would not incur personal liability for the torts
of their corporation, however, “unless they participate[d] in the wrong or
authorize[d] or direct[ed] that it be done.”79 In the context of a commercial
dispute, for example, in Wantickets RDM, LLC v. Eventbrite, Inc.,80 the New
75

N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112 (McKinney 2014).
§ 112(a)(1) (“The attorney-general may maintain an action or special proceeding: To annul the
corporate existence or dissolve a corporation that has acted beyond its capacity or power or to restrain it
from carrying on unauthorized activities . . . .”).
77
See generally Stephen D. Sencer, Note, Read My Lips: Examining the Legal Implications of
Knowingly False Campaign Promises, 90 MICH. L. REV. 428, 457–63 (1991) (exploring tort damages for
false campaign promises).
78
Derivative actions to address misdeeds of a board could, in New York, be maintained by five
percent or more of a membership corporation’s members. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623
(2019); see Segal v. Powers, 687 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (reading § 623 to require that
an action be brought by a minimum proportion of members and that the matter first be presented to the
board). N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720-a (2019), which provides broad immunity to directors
against third parties in circumstances other than gross negligence or intentional misconduct, does not
immunize directors from the reach of federal statutes to the extent the claims are based upon federal law.
This section also does not apply to actions taken by the Attorney General or actions commenced under
§ 719 (director liability in certain defined transactions) or § 720 (actions brought on behalf of the
organization).
79
Meeker v. McLaughlin, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117211 at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2018); see also
Marine Midland Bank v. John E. Russo Produce Co., 405 N.E.2d 205, 212 (N.Y. 1980) (“[C]orporate
officers and directors are not liable for fraud unless they personally participate in the misrepresentation
or have actual knowledge of it.”).
80
No. 654277/2016, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2780 (Sup. Ct. July 21, 2017).
76
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York Commercial Division recently denied a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, stating
that there were sufficient allegations that a manager “provide[d] ‘substantial
assistance’ to the primary violator” in order to plead knowing participation
in a breach of fiduciary duty.81
A state attorney general does not ordinarily bring criminal charges
against board members or organizations, but there have been exceptions.
Although uncommon, a state attorney general has the capability to prosecute
individual board members when their conduct is evidently criminal.
Professor Evelyn Brody writes, “[i]n rare cases, conduct by the organization
or individuals rises to the level of criminal activity — for example, the
deliberate and flagrant use of an exempt school to convert personal
expenditures into deductible charitable contributions.”82 Brody also
highlights the possibility of criminal prosecutions for supporting terrorism
where fraudulent misreporting to State or Federal agencies plays a role.83
United States v. Mubayyid,84 for example, upheld an individual’s convictions
for filing false Form 990s and informational returns, which concealed a
jihadist website, newsletter, and orphan sponsorship program for families of
martyred mujahideen.85
Foundational principles of nonprofit law provide a separate basis for
considering whether the organization faces liability for involvement in the
corruption of the political process. In the situations discussed above, if an
individual or individuals worked inside a nonprofit, in bad faith, to corrupt
an election, the state attorney general, responsible for protecting the integrity
of nonprofit organizations and the integrity of the election system, would be
within the bounds of her role to refer the matter for prosecution to the State’s
Attorney.
IV. INTERJURISDICTIONALITY
The final problem concerns the overlap between federal and state
authority, and the argument that the attorney general might be intruding on
other jurisdictional authority—that it is traditional for state attorneys general

81
Id. at *12–*13; see also Fitzgerald v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 383 F. Supp. 162, 167 (D.N.J. 1974) (“No
one is entitled to use the First Amendment protections as a shield behind which illegal activities are
conducted, or legal obligations are shirked.”).
82
Evelyn Brody, Reforming Tax Policy with Respect to Nonprofit Organizations, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 484, 493 (Matthew Harding ed., 2018).
83
Id.
84
658 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2011).
85
Id. at 64–65.

127

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

to defer to the IRS or the FEC in matters trenching on federal jurisdiction.86
In other work, I have argued for the value of more precisely delineating
jurisdictional boundaries to encourage enforcement.87
There are working relationships which operate to establish priorities for
enforcement. State and federal authorities devote their resources in a
consistent manner to some enforcement activities rather than others,
depending on current events and political philosophies. Such consistency
reduces concerns about double jeopardy, over-prosecution, and the like.
Regardless of the pressure state authorities may feel to go after a nonprofit
for its failure to pay state taxes on unrelated business income, such cases will
virtually always be an IRS priority.88 Conversely, no matter how forcefully
the IRS is urged to take up a conflict over the interpretation of a bylaw
(unless, perhaps, the bylaw involved discrimination subject to federal civil
rights laws or depended on the language of a federal tax provision for its
interpretation), or a dispute over governance succession, or a violation of the
duty of care or the duty of obedience, state action would probably occur
first.89
In the situations contemplated, however, federal authorities are not
incentivized or adequately empowered to protect important state interests,
and the breaches of duty are fiduciary ones, traditionally monitored by state
officials.90 Although the corruption of a national election would normally
invoke national regulatory authorities, the implementation of a corrupt and
illegal scheme through the misgovernance of a state-chartered nonprofit
would present a distinctive, hybrid type of problem.91
86
See Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 618 (2005)
(“Today there is, in substance, considerable overlapping enforcement responsibility of the principal state
and federal actors, namely the Attorneys General and the Internal Revenue Service.”).
87
Id. at 617–19.
88
Id. at 627 (quoting MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION xiii (2004)) (“[e]xempt organizations are no longer the
stepchildren of the Service . . . who view their role as assuring that exempt charitable organizations
continue to make [the] contributions to our society that are the rationale for the special status they are
afforded in the tax system.”).
89
Id. at 621 (“Except for federal tax law violations, few types of nonprofit wrongdoing have escaped
the purview of an Attorney General’s authority to investigate, and, if warranted, to prosecute
miscreants.”).
90
See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 726 (2011)
(arguing that different incentives and regulatory powers drove then-New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer to employ state securities law more aggressively than federal authorities who subsequently took
action under federal law).
91
If the attorney general attempted to prosecute election law violations or to challenge federal
election procedures, rather than to prosecute breaches of nonprofit fiduciary duty, this analysis would be
complicated by constitutional Supremacy Clause and Elections Clause considerations. See FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL AND STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 1 (1995),
https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fed_state_law_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5UK-T5RG]
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CONCLUSION

Safeguarding the election process from foreign interference in elections
has been documented as a pressing matter.92 Federal resources have been
marshalled and legal authorizations strengthened to address some of the
emerging threats.93 Further statutory and regulatory reform has not yet been
directed to the vulnerability to abuse as conduits of nonprofit organizations.94
In the absence of such reforms, it appears that federal election rules,
money laundering statutes, tax laws, and election rules are inadequately
suited to safeguarding the integrity of the nonprofit sector. Perhaps counterintuitively, this Essay therefore argues that federal efforts to hold nonprofit
social welfare organizations accountable are likely to be less effective in
protecting broad public interests than the existing rules that authorize state
attorneys general to act. State authorities can hold accountable officers and
directors who let nonprofits become vehicles for foreign interference in
national elections—as well as the organizations themselves.

(explaining brochure was designed to help “determine whether federal or state laws govern a particular
election activity”); see also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 394 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Foster v. Love,
522 U.S. 67, 74 (1997)) (providing an approach for reviewing state election voter registration procedures,
specifically when state legislation affecting federal voter registration procedures are reviewed pursuant
to the Elections Clause rather than preemption analysis under the Supremacy Clause, and where
“Congress addressed the same subject as the state law, we consider whether the federal act has superseded
the state act, based on a natural reading of the two laws and viewing the federal act as if it were a
subsequent enactment by the same legislature”). Under a preemption analysis, “Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.” Id. at 392 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566
n.3 (2009)).
92
See, e.g., 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 50 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW6U-H43S] (documenting
intrusions targeting the administration of U.S. elections); U.S. S. COMM. ON FIN. MINORITY STAFF REP.,
THE NRA AND RUSSIA: HOW A TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION BECAME A FOREIGN ASSET 75 (Sept.
2019),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6430090-The-NRA-Russia-How-a-Tax-ExemptOrganization.html [https://perma.cc/2ZFN-3X9N] (“This report illustrates potential weaknesses related
to potential misuse of tax-exempt resources by section 501(c)(4) organizations and how such misuse can
expose an organization to improper influence.”).
93
Regarding authorizations, see, e.g., John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1642(a), 132 Stat. 1636, 2132 (2018) (authorizing active cyber defense
measures against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea); Philip Bump, What’s Russia Still Doing to
Interfere With U.S. Politics—And What’s the U.S. Doing About It?, WASH. POST (May 3, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/03/whats-russia-still-doing-interfere-with-uspolitics-whats-us-doing-about-it/?utm_term=.6ca81a1e41e5 [https://perma.cc/9W25-49ML] (assessing
potential for interference in 2020 election cycle).
94
U.S. S. COMM. ON FIN. MINORITY STAFF REP., supra note 92, at 75 (recognizing the “potential
weaknesses to foreign intelligence threats by American tax-exempt organizations” and suggesting that
Congress further reform the current tax-exempt laws by promoting increased disclosure requirements and
information reporting, and strengthening campaign finance rules to protect against foreign intrusions).
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